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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UT.AH, 
Plaintiff-Jlespondent, I 
Case No. 
Y. ! 11315 
KENNETH DE ~UAR H.OSEN"- ) 
BA U:U, zr--. I' l 1 ll _Jc.1c111 an'-, Vi'c ant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Kenneth De Mar Rosenbaum, 
appeals his conviction for the crime of burglary in the 
third degree and from a denial of a motion for a new 
trial in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, 
Utah, the Honorable :Marcellus K. Snow presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The appellant was charged jointly with Jeffrey 
Lee Hobbs with the crime of burglary in the third 
l 
degree. He was tried in the absence of his co-defendant, 
who had been committed to a federal narcotics hospitaJ. 
The appellant was found guilty by jmy verdict of the 
crime charged and was sentenced to the term in the 
Utah State prison prescribed by law. The trial court 
denied the appellant's motion for a new trial. 
RELIEF SOGGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the judgment of the trial 
court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The .Medical Center Garage located on South 
Temple and Fifth East, Salt Lake City, Utah, was 
burglarized August 18, 1967, and approximately thirty-
five dollars was taken from a soft drink vending ma-
chine. (R.64-65) 
A complaint signed August 25, 1967, charged the 
appellant and Jeffrey Hobbs with the crime of burglary 
in the third degree. 
The appellant had a preliminary hearing separate 
from his co-defendant and was bound over to District 
Court for trial. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-17 (1953) 
the appellant filed notice of alibi January 29, 1968. 
(R.14) 
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Immediately after the burglary each of the wit-
uesses gave descriptions of the persons near the soft 
drink vending machine at the time of the burglary to 
Dave Bradford, a poiice officer of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department. Although the descriptions differed 
in detail, Officer Bradford was able to select a set of 
photographs from which each of the witnesses identified 
the appellant as the person present during the burglary. 
( R. 76) 
Officer Bradford testified that l\lr. Beatie, the 
lessee and operator of the burglarized garage, had de-
scribed the person present during the burglary as hav-
ing ta toos on both arms. ( R. 78) Under cross-examina-
tion, the appellant acknowledged having tatoos on both 
arms. (R.101) 
Mr. Mike Beatie testified that he had checked the 
soft drink vending machine located in his garage on 
the morning of August 18, 1967, and it had contained 
approximately thirty-five dollars. (R.63-64) 
About 3:00 o'clock p.m. on the same day, Mr. 
Beatie saw the appellant, Kenneth Rosenbaum, and 
Jeffrey Hobbs "hanging around the coke machine." 
(R.65) Becoming suspicious, Mr. Beatie moved to a 
position where he could watch them. As he watched, the 
door to the soft drink vending machine swung open. 
(R.65) 
Mr. Beatie yelled to his employee, Robert Best, 
and the hrn men ran from the building. (R.55) An im-
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mediate inventory of the yeuding machine revealed that 
the money box was missing. ( R.66) 
Robert Best pursued both me11, apprehending 
Jeffrey Hobbs, while the other person, later identified 
by Mr. Best as the appellant, escaped in a nearby car 
driven by a third person. (R.91) 
Brent Pack, owner and operator of a business lo-
cated in the .Medical Center Garage, was present at 
the time of the burglary. He testified that he recognized 
the appellant as one of the persons present at the time 
of the burglary ( R.83, 94, 87) and that the two men 
looked suspicious. He told Mike Beatie to "keep an eye 
on them." (R.84) 
Kenneth Rosenbaum offered as his defense an 
alibi that he ·was with two friends on the day and at 
the time of the burglary (R.98), and that he was not 
with Jeffrey Hobbs 011 the day of the burglary. (R.99) 
The alibi witness, Clarence Moore, testified that 
the appellant was with him during the day and time 
of the burglary and that they did not go near the Medi-
cal Center that day. (R.109) 
The jury, after receiving testimony on behalf of 
the state and the appellant, found the appellant guilty 
as charged. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS NOT REYERSIBLE ERROR FOR 
THE TRIAL COURT TO GIVE CAUTIONARY 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DEFENSE OF 
ALIBI. 
A. Instruction number 6 did not shift to the appel-
lant the burden of establishing his alibi. 
13. Instruction number 6 did not shift from the 
state the burden of proving each element of the crime 
of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. 
C. Any error in instruction number 6 was cor-
rected by other instructions. 
D. Any error in instruction number 6 is not sub-
stantial error requiring a new trial within the meaning 
of U tab Code Ann. § 77 -38-3 ( 5) ( 1953) . 
These argument are discussed together. 
The prosecution requested and the trial court in-
structed the jury: 
Due to the very nature of the defense of alibi, 
in that it is easily fabricated and difficult to dis-
proYe, you shoul~l consider it with caution. 
It is conceded that the defense of alibi is a legitimate 
and rroper defense. State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 
P.2d 647 ( 1937). 'Vhile an instruction which tends 
to disparage or belittle the defense of alibi may be 
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erroneous, there is room to differ as to what constitutes 
a disparaging instruction to the defense of alibi . 
. . . in some jurisdictions it is settled that there 
is nothing improper in instructions of a kind 
which, generally speaking, may be characterized 
as being merely cautionary as to the defense of 
alibi. 146 A.L.R. 1377 at 1379 ( 1943) 
The primary objection to giving instructions which 
tend to disparage the defense of alibi is that they tend 
to have the effect of shifting the burden of proving 
the alibi to the person asserting the alibi. 
In State v. Wilson, 238 Minn. 451, 57 N.\V.2d 
412 ( 1953) quoting favorably State v. Duddy, 15~ 
Minn. 179, 188 N."\V. 261 (1922), the court held: 
"\Ve find no reversible error in this instruction 
••• 1 It did not have the effect of casting upon 
defendant the burden of establishing the alibi 
as a defense, nor in any proper view of impairing 
or negatiYing the general presumption of inno-
cence. The Court was quite clear in placing the 
burden of proof on the state, and instructing the 
jury that no verdict of guilty could be returned, 
except they found from all the evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt that defendant was a party 
to the commission of the crime. See also State 
v. Keezer, 274 .Minn. 292, 143 N.,V.2d 627 
(1966). 
It is true that the defendant has the burden of 
coming forward with evidence which would be sufficient 
1 " It will be remembered always that an alibi is a defense th~t ·is easily fabricated and hard to disprove;. but, if !?roved, 
it is a good defense, I say that merely to caut10n ~he ~ury to 
consi<ler the evidence on both sides and weigh 1t care· 
fully." 
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lo permit the trial court to give instructions as to the 
defense of alibi if so requested. But to be a ground for 
a jury to find the defendant not guilty, the defense 
of alibi must be established only to the degree that it 
would lead reasonable men to conclude that there was 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, i.e., that 
the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt one 
of the elements of the crime charged. See 146 A.L.R. 
1377 at 1382 ( 1942) and cases cited. 
Thus it was held in State v. Waid, supra, and 
State v. JJThitel,lJ, 100 Utah 13, llO P.2d 337 (1941), 
that it is error for a trial court to give any instruction 
which tends to shift the burden of proving the defense 
of alibi to the defendant, since it is the law in Utah that 
the burden of proof is always on the prosecution and 
uever shifts to the defense during the trial. See People 
v. Tracy, 1 Utah 343 ( 1876). 
In Instruction No. 8 ( R.31) the trial court said 
in part: 
... it is necessary in order to justify a verdict 
of guilty that each and every one of the elements 
enumer;ded he proven to your .rntisfaction and 
beyond a reasonable doubt. You are further in-
structed that in the event the State so proves 
each and every element by the proof as afore-
said, then and in that event you would be war-
ranted in finding the defendant guilty. (Empha-
is added) ... 
If ... any element lacks the proof as afore-
said . . . it ~vould be your duty to find the de-
f enda ut not guilty of the offense. 
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The instructions in the instant case clearly placed 
on the State the burden of proving each element of the 
crime. In instruction No. 6 ( R.29) the jury was told: 
The <lefeudanl KENNETH ROSEN-
BAUM in this case has introduced evidence tend-
ing to prove that he was not present at the time 
and place of the commission of the alleged of-
fense, for which he is here on trial. If after a 
consideration of all the evidence, you have a rea-
sonable doubt whether or not the defendant 
was present at the time the crime was committed, 
he is entitled to an acquital. 
In instruction No. 13 ( R.36) the jury was told: 
You are instructed that the defendant is a 
competent witness in his own behalf and his tes-
timony should be receiYed and given the same 
consideration as you give to that of any other 
witness .... you should weigh his testimony the 
same as you weigh the testimony of any other 
witness. 
It does not appear from the instructions that the 
burden of proving that the alleged crime was com-
mitted by the appellant was ever shifted from the prose-
cution. Instruction number 7 (R.30) which cautioned 
the jury that the defense of alibi is easily fabricated 
and difficult to disprove, and therefore should be con-
sidered with caution, did not have the effect of shifting 
to the defense the burden of proving the defendant's 
alibi. 
Furthermore, it cannot be said that instruction 
number 7 was given in error since it informed the jury 
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of such matters as they, as men of affairs, already knew. 
Thus in /l'ielder et al v. United States, 277 Fed 832 
(8th Cir. 1915) the court held that it was not error for 
the trial court to have instructed the jury as follows: 
An alibi is a proper defense in a criminal 
case; it is a defense which as men of affairs you 
know is more easy to build up than some other 
defenses. Also see People v. Marcus, 253 Mich. 
410, 235 N.,V. 202 (1931); State v. TVoolworth, 
H8 Kan. 180, 81P.2d43 (1938), cert. den., 317 
U.S. 671 (1942). 
This case recognized that cne's i·cason dictates that an 
alibi defense can be coucocte<l with relative ease among 
friends or family in their desire to help a person with 
whom a close personal relationship exists. 
In the case now at hand instruction number 7 
only pointed out the obvious to the jury, something 
which in all probability had already been recognized. 
Based on this reasonable assumption, instruction num-
ber 7 cannot be said to have been prejudicial to de-
fendant's substantial rights. Under Utah law, a new 
trial is to be granted only when an error has been made 
which substantially affects the rights of the defendant. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-3 ( .5) which states that 
a new trial will be granted a defendant only: 
"Then the court has misdirected the jury in 
a matter of law, or has erred in the decision of 
any question of law arising during the cour~e 
of the trial, or has done or allowed any act m 
the cause prejudicial to the substantial rights 
of the defendant. 
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The state submits that jury instruction number 7 
did not affect defendant's substantial rights so as to 
prejudice these rights. Hence, a new trial under the 
statute should not be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant was identified by three witnesses 
as the person present at the scene of the burglary. From 
their descriptions of the appellant the i1westigating 
officers selected an array of photographs from which 
these witnesses were able to identify the appellant as 
the person present at the time of the burglary. The 
trial court instructed the jury that the burden of prov-
ing every element of the crime of burglary was on the 
prosecution, and that the def endaq.±: \Vas a competent 
witness in his own behalf whose testimony should be 
gi,,en the same consideration as that of any other 
witness. 
The questioned instruction did not shift the burden 
of proof nor prejudice defendant's substantial rights. 
Therefore, it is submitted that this court affirm the 
verdict and judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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